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We analyze whether or not the globalization of capital, ‘disciplines’  governments and 
improves governance. We demonstrate that globalization affects governance, by increasing a 
country’s vulnerability to sudden capital flight. This increased threat of capital flight can 
discipline governments and improve governance and welfare by placing countries in a ‘golden 
straitjacket’. However, globalization may also ‘overdiscipline’ governments - resulting in a 
perverse impact on governmental incentives that catalyzes (mis)governance. Accordingly, the 
paper suggests a novel (and qualified) role for capital controls. Finally, we provide some 
suggestive evidence consistent with the predictions from our theoretical framework. 
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Eaton, Parikshit Ghosh, Dani Rodrik, Anandi Mani and Alwyn Young as well at participants 
in numerous seminars. 1 Introduction
The last several decades have witnessed dramatic reductions in the cost of moving capital across countries.
Moreover, the resulting globalization of capital has been accompanied by a transformation in the practice
of policymaking and governance (Rodrik, 2011). In this paper we analyze the impact of this globalization
of capital on the quality of a country's governance. We ask, does the threat of capital ight constrain
and `discipline' governments and improve governance? Or is the exacerbated threat of capital ight
that accompanies globalization, a stick that goes too far resulting in (mis)governance? In analyzing this
relationship between governance, institutional quality and globalization, our paper throws further light
on aspects of the design of international nancial architecture. In particular, should countries encourage
the free ow of capital and information? Or do capital controls have a place in the policymaker's toolbox?
The relationship between the forces of globalization and governance has received considerable attention
in recent years. On the one hand we have the view exemplied by Summers (2000), Obstfeld (1998) who
argue that in a globalizing world where information is freely available and capital is mobile, governments
are forced to get disciplined and governance is improved.1 Indeed recent work by Kose, Prasad, Rogo
and Wei (2009) and Mishkin (2007) suggests that the main benets from the globalization of capital
ows are `collateral' such as improved market discipline and good governance. In contrast, a much more
skeptical view about globalization's impact on governance is held by Rodrik and Subramaniam (2009),
Stiglitz (2010) and Krugman (1999). Indeed they argue that the globalization of capital ows may provide
the wrong incentives to government and result in indiscipline and (mis)governance. These two sharply
diering views on the incentive eects of globalization have been hard to reconcile. In part this is because
the relationship between globalization and good governance is a complex one and the empirical evidence
on this issue (such as there is) is mixed.2 In this paper we provide both a conceptual framework that
helps us think systematically about these diverging viewpoints and empirical evidence in support of the
mechanism through which globalization aects governance.
The theoretical framework has two key features. First, we allow for a country's institutions of gover-
1Obstfeld (1998) argues that \the main potential positive role of international capital markets is to discipline policymak-
ers.". This view is exemplied in Thomas Friedman's (2000) book on globalization where he argues the international capital
market puts countries in a \golden straitjacket" and constrains the worst excesses of governments and enacts policies that
are socially optimal, in turn rewarding them with capital inows.
2For instance, Tytell and Wei (2004) argue that despite its theoretical plausibility it is dicult to `nd robust and strong
causal evidence'.
1nance to be imperfect. A state's capacity to precommit and implement ecient policies may be incomplete
(Besley and Persson, 2011). In particular, we build on Tirole (1994) and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)
to identify an ineciency that we argue, lies at the heart of all decision making within government - an
inability for governmental actors to precommit to enacting ecient policies. However, our framework also
allows for another commitment problem - this time with respect to investors. In particular, we assume
that investors are unable to precommit to retaining investment in the host country. In other words,
in light of new information, investors may either keep their investment or engage in capital ight. We
analyze the impact on governance of the globalization of capital in the context of these twin commitment
problems.
Our framework demonstrates that decision making within government is often characterized by a soft
budget constraint. The government-policymaker persists in backing projects (or businesses) that are often
characterized by low eort, budget overruns and low productivity. In this context, the globalization of
capital (driven by the lower costs of international capital mobility) can exacerbate the threat of capital
ight. The paper demonstrates that the key relationship to be analyzed is how this increased threat of
capital ight aects the incentive problem that plagues much of governmental decision making. On the
one hand, we show that the exacerbated threat of capital ight may constrain the set of actions taken by
the government. Indeed, in doing so, the globalization of capital may shackle governments in a `golden
straitjacket', and have a positive \incentive" eect on decision making within government. This may
suggest that the standard view about the disciplining role of globalization is indeed correct. However, our
analysis suggests a more nuanced view is in order. It is not merely the increased threat of capital ight
that accompanies the globalization of capital that is of relevance. Rather we argue, that the impact of
globalization on incentives within government, depends on the structure of the country's economy. If the
country has strong economic fundamentals (for e.g. due to a structurally diversied export sector) and
is less sensitive to random shocks in the global economy, then globalization is likely to have a positive
incentive eect. The globalization of capital works as a `discipline' device so long as capital ight is mainly
triggered o by actions within government and not due to the volatility of the global economy. In contrast,
if random changes in the external environment have the potential to trigger capital ight, then this may
have perverse eects. In this case, the threat of capital ight overdisciplines governments, resulting in a
negative \incentive" eect and mis-governance. This is a striking implication since it suggests that the
impact of globalization on governance can go either way.
2We further analyze the impact on national welfare of this globalization of capital. We begin by
characterizing the second-best welfare benchmark where there is no ineciency in government decision
making. Globalization lowers the cost of capital mobility, making capital ight relatively easy. Therefore,
this globalization makes a country vulnerable to capital ight, especially when the economy is not doing
well. We show that this inability to \capture" foreign investment at high levels of global integration,
always adversely aects national welfare. We then go on to describe the welfare impact of globalization,
relative to this second-best welfare benchmark. We show that the impact of globalization on welfare is
through the \incentive" eect of good governance. However, this incentive eect depends on the structure
of the country's economy. Globalization is likely to improve welfare if a country is less vulnerable to
random shocks either because it is relatively developed, or has a diversied export sector. In other words,
if this globalization makes the country vulnerable to the threat of capital ight mainly when there is
ineciency in government, then the incentive eect improves welfare. In contrast, this incentive eect
has a negative impact on welfare, if the country has weak fundamentals - (for e.g., specializes in exporting
mining or primary goods that suer from volatility) or faces a weak and volatile global economy. In these
situations, globalization lowers welfare by having a negative incentive eect on governance - due to the
country being made vulnerable to the threat of unwarranted capital ight - i.e. independent of the actions
of policymakers within government.
In a globalized world, governments are vulnerable to exogenous and sudden shifts in investor sentiment.
A crisis in another country can make a country directly increase uncertainty in nancial markets. Such
an increase in global uncertainty has an unambiguously negative impact on the quality of bureaucratic
governance. We further show that this adverse impact on governance is much higher in countries with
low bureaucratic state-capacity (see Besley and Persson, 2011). Furthermore, countries with high state
capacity are much less likely to use capital controls as a tool to mitigate the adverse impact on bureaucratic
incentives. We use these theoretical predictions to guide our empirical analysis. In particular, we use
the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 as a natural experiment which results in an increase in uncertainty
in international nancial markets. A prediction of our theoretical framework is that the impact of this
greater uncertainty on governance should be highest for those countries that are perceived to be `similar'
to Mexico and have relatively weak institutional `state capacity'. Indeed, we nd suggestive evidence
consistent with this prediction.
The issue of the appropriateness of capital controls has been central to the debate on the design
3of international nancial architecture. The position of the IMF for most of the past two decades has
been quite clear - a country would only be able to reap the gains of nancial globalization, if capital
controls were reduced or eliminated.3 This view has been echoed by economists such as Edwards (1999),
Dornbusch (1998) among others. In contrast, Rodrik (1998), Bhagwati (1998), Eichengreen (1999) are
much more sympathetic to the idea of imposing restrictions on capital mobility. Indeed recently, the
IMF Sta Position Paper (2010) also suggests a turnaround in that it argues that under some conditions
capital controls can well be part of a policymaker's toolkit. This picture is further muddied by the
fact that the empirical evidence does not provide us with a clean answer. We argue that the absence of
consensus (both at a theoretical and empirical level) on the usefulness of capital controls is understandable
as arguments made by both the proponents as well as critics of the use of capital controls may be of
relevance. Two factors are important - the quality of a country's institutional state capacity as well
as the overall uncertainty in the external economic environment. Arguments for controls are strongest
perhaps when the country's institutional state capacity are relatively weak and the country is vulnerable
to capital ight arising from an uncertain and volatile global economic environment. We should also
emphasize that our paper has identied a very distinct argument for the qualied use (and abolition) of
capital controls - namely how the threat of capital ight may adversely eect (or improve) the incentives
for good governance.
Related Literature: There is a small but growing literature that examines the link between governance
and the globalization of capital. In the context of scal federalism, Qian and Roland (1996) use an
incomplete contractual structure to show that governments have a tendency to bail out failing state
enterprises. In this context they show that federalism by encouraging competition may discipline regional
governments by punishing corrupt governments with capital ight. Cai and Treisman (2005) examine
how the increased competition to attract international capital that globalization entails, may discipline
governments. However, they argue that this `disciplining' eect is driven by the assumption of countries
having dierent resource endowments, be it capital, human capital or infrastructure. In contrast, we
3As late as 1997, the IMF Interim Committee argued that \the liberalization of capital ows is an essential element
of an ecient international monetary system in this age of globalization". This is quoted from Rodrik (2011) who has a
fascinating discussion about the debate within the IMF and the larger historical context in which it takes place. Indeed
Rodrik (1999) quotes the IMF's World Economic Outlook from October 98 to argue that \[T]he introduction by Malaysia in
early September of exchange and capital controls may also turn out to be an important setback not only to that country's
recovery and potentially to its future development, but also to other emerging market economies that have suered from
heightened investor fears of similar actions elsewhere".
4argue that the threat of capital ight may have a very dierent impact on governance even if countries
have the same resource endowments, productivity and state capacity. We show that small dierences
in the nature of the uncertainty in a country's economic environment alone can result in lower costs of
international capital mobility.
Ju and Wei (2011) emphasize the two way relationship between international capital ows and the
strength of domestic institutions. However, their main focus is on the implications of globalization
on a complementary set of institutions - corporate governance and the nancial system rather than
ineciencies to decision making within government and the bureaucracy. Tressel and Verdier (2007)
argue that the liberalization of capital is often an endogenous decision that has been carried out with
the collusion of foreign banks and investors - often to the detriment of the governance of the domestic
nancial system. Both the scope and notion of globalization and governance is quite dierent from
what we have in this paper. Besley and Smart (2002) show that the impact of greater competition for
mobile capital depends on the `type' of politician-policymaker in oce. Chang (2011) examines how
the globalization of short run capital mobility often interacts with elections and magnies the impact of
exogenous shocks. While our paper is more about decision making within government, we should note
that political economy considerations can exacerbate the magnitude of ineciency in decision making
within government. Mukand (2006) uses a signaling model, where a policymaker's choice of policy to
show that governments have an incentive to play the `condence game' and enact inecient policies in
order to attract mobile capital. Similarly, Bartolini and Drazen (1997) also use a signaling model to
explore the implications of capital account liberalization as an indicator of future policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the model in Section 2 and analyze the
equilibrium in Section 3. Welfare analysis and other implications of the model are discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 outlines empirical evidence supporting the model and Section 6 concludes.
2 Description of the Model
Before we describe the model in detail, we begin by describing the key features of our framework.
(i) There exists a symbiotic relationship between the government and foreign investors. The government
supplies a public good that augments the returns to foreign investment. In turn, foreign capital by
employing domestic factors, enhances national welfare.
(ii) We distinguish between the policymaker-government and the bureaucrat or public sector (or banking
5sector) manager, with the manager-bureaucrat being in charge of actual implementation of the public
project. An incomplete contractual structure ensures that the government cannot commit the bureaucrat
to choose the ecient action. The productivity of this public project determines the private returns to
the export sector.
(iii) We consider a small open economy, where the export sector produces a good that is sold on the
world market. We are interested in capturing the resilience of the country's economy to global shocks in a
parsimonious way. Accordingly, we focus on the volatility of earnings of the export sector. For instance,
if the economy specializes in exporting mining or primary products, then its export revenue is likely to
be vulnerable to volatility. In contrast, if the economy is strong and well-diversied, then shocks to good
prices in the world economy have much smaller impacts on the volatility of the revenue of this export
sector. Therefore, countries with strong fundamentals are assumed to have well diversied export sectors
and are less sensitive to random shocks to the global economy. We should emphasize that we choose this
particular interpretation merely for the expositional convenience of our formal model.
(iv) A representative foreign investor invests capital in a private project in the export sector of the host
country which require two stages to set up. At the second stage, the investor has to decide whether to
withdraw capital or whether to rollover the initial investment made. The investor observes the return
from its investment in the export sector prior to the rollover decision. The observed return depends on
both bureaucrat eort and global shocks. Globalization decreases the cost of withdrawing capital at the
rollover stage to the foreign investor.
Governance: The Government and the Bureaucrat - The policymaker-government maximizes
the return to domestic factors. Therefore, it attempts to attract foreign investment in the export sector,
which through its employment of domestic factors, boosts national income.4 The government can choose
to initiate a public infrastructure project that aects the returns to foreign investment. The infrastructure
can be of varying quality - high or low. Completion of the public project requires investment at two points
in time. There is an initial startup cost C1 and a project completion cost Cc. Therefore the government's
welfare is a function of total output net of all project completion costs i.e. WY = Y   (C1 + Cc) where
Y is additional revenue generated by foreign investment in the export sector economy and  is the share
4By assumption we rule out outright expropriation to avoid complicating our analysis with sovereign debt issues. Not only
are these issues well-understood (Eaton and Fernandez, 1995), but also outright expropriation is rarely observed. However,
in our analysis, a bad realization of the public good is like an implicit tax/expropriation.
6of that revenue that accrues to the government as public revenue.
The government delegates to a bureaucrat, the actual implementation of the public infrastructure
project that determines the returns to investment.5 The bureaucrat's eort choice e 2 [0;1] is unobserv-
able. The disutility from eort  (e) is increasing (higher eort is costly) and convex in e. For simplicity
of exposition, we assume that the bureaucrat's choice of eort e results in infrastructure of productivity
e.
In addition to the disutility of eort, the bureaucrat gets a private, non-appropriable utility  from
completion of the public project. The idea is that the bureaucrat gets some benet from the continuation
of the project and the government cannot complete the project without the bureaucrat. As Dewatripont
and Maskin(1995) point out, this gain can be in terms of any private, non-appropriable payo including
additional perks or any human capital gain from increased use of the technology. Hence the bureaucrat's
utility function is given by: UB =     (e) where  >  (1) > 0 if the public project is completed and
zero otherwise and  (e) is a (weakly) convex function of eort with lime!0  0(e) = 0.6
Investment, Capital Flight and Globalization: Investment takes place in a single private rm in
the export sector that requires an initial capital investment (normalized to one unit) which has to last
two periods before yielding output and a return. Output is a function of the initial investment made as
well as the productivity of the public good. This opportunity to invest is given to a group of identical
risk neutral investors. Without loss of generality, we assume that decision-making within the group is
delegated to an individual who maximizes aggregate group prots.7 This group of investors can raise
the initial capital investment at a per unit cost R. While the investment is for two periods, investors do
receive interim information (the revenue generated by the project), that tells them whether to liquidate
and withdraw their capital from the country, or to retain it in the project.
The initial unit of capital invested in the export sector yields Y units of revenue two periods later,
where Y = e. We take  to be an exogenous shock distributed on [0;1] that aects according to the pdf
f(). This variable can be interpreted as a shock to global prices of the export sector good that may arise
5It is useful to keep in mind that in our analysis a low productivity outcome of the public good, is isomorphic to the case
of a cost overrun in the provision of the public good, where the cost overrun and the associated decit results in a higher
marginal tax on foreign investment.
6The incomplete contractual structure is based on Dewatripont and Maskin(1995) and Tirole(1994).
7Our assumptions imply that investors coordinate their withdrawal decisions. Therefore, we do not consider issues of
investor coordination failure because we want to focus on a dierent, if complementary, set of reasons why a country might
want to impose capital controls.
7out of unexpected changes in demand or supply in the global economy. Therefore, if the investment in the
export sector project lasts the entire two periods, the aggregate payo to the investors is (1   )Y   R.
In contrast, if the investment is liquidated early, it will be taken out of the country yielding a (normalized)
return of 1 per unit of capital initially invested. In this case if the investment is terminated early (i.e. in
one period), and the capital is withdrawn and invested abroad, the aggregate group payo is 1   cw   R
where cw  0 is the (additional) cost of moving capital across international borders when the project is
terminated early, essentially the cost of short-term movements of capital across national boundaries.
Given enough time, capital is always movable across borders - whether or not there are explicit
restrictions on capital ows. However, what is truly distinctive of the nature of capital ows over the past
few decades has been the dramatic reductions in the barriers to the movement of capital across borders,
especially in the short run. This has resulted in the globalization of capital and the possibility of sudden
capital ight. Accordingly, we focus on the globalization arising out of a reduction in the immediate
short-run cost of moving capital across international borders. This reduction in the cost cw, can be driven
by a combination of technological and policy related factors. For example, a policy change that results
in a reduction in capital controls reduces barriers mainly to short-run mobility of capital. Indeed, given
our focus on the impact of capital ight on `discipline', our analysis focuses on the impact of changes in
capital controls.
Alternatively, these changes in capital controls may work in conjuction with a combination of tech-
nological (or institutional) factors that may also aect the cost of short term capital movements. These
factors would include any and all factors that aect the degree of nancial integration of a country with
the global economy that can in eect be treated as a parameter - from the overall availability of infor-
mation, the level of development or the geographical proximity to major nancial centers and so on. For
simplicity, in much of what follows we interpret an increase in globalization as a reduction in cw arising
out of technological changes. However, in Section 4 we will also explicitly consider the role of capital
controls, when we take cw to be a choice variable of the government-policymaker. Neither formulation
changes in a qualitative way the results that we highlight.
Information and the Timing of Decisions: Since investors care about the expected returns on
their investment, any information on the productivity of the public infrastructure project would be at a
premium. We assume that if there is an initial investment in the project, before deciding whether or not
to rollover the project, each investor observes the expected returns to the private investment project (i.e.
8the export sector) Y but does not observe either e or  separately.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The government makes the decision of whether to initiate the public infrastructure project by incurring
the initial setup cost C1. At this stage the government also (when it is a parameter) observes the value
of cw. Similarly, if it is interpreted as a choice variable, then the policymaker chooses cw (as in capital
controls).
2. The foreign investor group chooses whether or not to invest one unit of capital in the investment
project in the export sector of the host country- that takes two periods to mature.
3. The bureaucrat then makes an (unobservable) eort choice e that determines the productivity of the
public project and hence, revenue from the investment project.
4. In the next stage, investors observe the overall returns and protability of investment in the export sec-
tor project Y and the representative investor decides whether or not to withdraw or retain the investment
in the country.
5. The government chooses whether it wants to abandon or complete the public project by paying the
completion cost Cc after observes the productivity of the public project as well as the returns to the
private export sector.
6. If the project is completed, the public infrastructure productivity is realized. This determines private
sector output and the returns to investment for foreign investors.
In the following sections, we solve the above game of incomplete information backwards.
We will solve the model over the following two sections. In section 3, we will characterize the link
between the threat of capital withdrawal and bureaucrat's eort choice. This section is, thus, devoted
to the study of the impact of globalization (viewed in terms of costs of withdrawing capital) on the
disciplining of nations. In section 4, we will characterize decisions that determine whether the project is
initiated and not prematurely liquidated. The focus in this section will be on examining the consequences
of changes in the cost of suddenly withdrawing capital from a country on its national welfare.
3 Governance and Capital Flight: The Framework
In this section we solve for our equilibrium and highlight aspects that are of interest. For the moment,
we assume that the government lacks state-capacity - in that it is unable to commit the bureaucrat to
choose the rst-best level of eort.
93.1 Capital Flight and the Soft Budget Constraint
Governments often face a dilemma with regard to the nancing of projects - be it public sector cost
overruns or nancial bail outs for the banking sector. Indeed the inability to cut-o funding of projects
that are doing badly has long term adverse incentive eects. We analyze the conditions under which such
ineciency may arise in our framework. First, note that if the revenue from the export sector project is
Y , the government will complete the public sector project if and only if the payo from doing so exceeds
the project completion cost, i.e. if
Y  Cc:
Recollect that the share of total revenue that enters the government's payo (e.g. weight on the domestic
sector) is given by . Accordingly, if Cc  0, the government can never commit not to complete the
project. We show that this possibility, when the cost of project completion is low, results in a soft budget
constraint8.
Next, we turn to the decision of the representative investor to keep the money within the country
or to withdraw it. In our model, the representative investor cannot credibly precommit to keep money
within the country. If the economic environment deteriorates, the investor will pull investment out of
the country and there will be capital ight. Whether or not the representative investor actually engaged
in capital ight depends on whether the productivity of the investment project is high enough. We now
calculate the critical threshold value such that there is capital ight if productivity is below this threshold
and not otherwise.
At the time when investors have to make the decision of whether to retain or withdraw their initial
investment in the private sector export project R, this cost is `sunk' and does not enter the private investor
calculus. This implies that the representative investor will withdraw his capital i the continuation value
of capital ight, 1 cw, is greater than the expected continuation value of retaining the investment in the
8Kornai(1980) was the rst to observe the soft budget constraint in the context of socialist and transition economies.
Public sector enterprises as well as the banking sector(Cho & Kim(1995) and Borensztein & Lee(1998)) have been plagued
by the soft budget constraint. In this paper we have chosen a model where poor incentives for a bureaucrat generates
ineciencies. This is because of two reasons - rst, it is the simplest way to emphasize the underlying incentive problem
without detracting from the focus on information and second, because we can easily re-interpret the model as being applicable
to a variety of economic scenarios. These include the case of a public sector plagued with cost overruns and scal decits
arising out of an incomplete contractual structure with a public sector manager or ineciencies amongst various branches
of government (see Alesina and Perotti (1996)). Furthermore, (with modications) the bureaucrat can be thought of as the
manager of a banking sector plagued by a soft budget constraint, which results in bad loans.
10project, (1   )Y . In other words, on observing that the returns are Y , the investor will not engage in
capital ight and keep the investment in the country if and only if:
(1   )Y  1   cw
or equivalently,




Therefore, the initial unit of investment will be retained in the country i the productivity of the public
sector project is higher than some threshold value - we label it the investor's capital ight threshold.9
Further, observe that the investor's capital ight threshold is itself decreasing in the cost of withdrawing
capital cw. In other words the higher is the short-run cost of withdrawing the capital cw (lower  Y ), the
more likely it is that foreign investors will roll over the investment and retain it in the country. At one
extreme when cw > 1, the representative investor never withdraws her investment so that the threat of
capital ight is an empty one. At the other extreme if the cost of withdrawing capital is very low so that
1   cw > 1   , equivalently  > cw, the investor will always withdraw: in this case, capital ight will
occur with probability one.
3.2 (Mis)Governance, Capital Flight and Bureaucratic Eort
We now examine how the threat of capital ight aects the quality of governance (i.e. bureaucrat eort).
In particular, for any given eort level e, the bureaucrat will compute the probability that the gov-
ernment (suering from a soft budget) will continue with the infrastructure project. This probability is
given by,
Pr(e  Y ) = Pr( 
Y
e




i.e. for any given level of eort e the probability that the productivity of the investment project will










    (e): (2)
9Although in the remainder of the paper we focus on the case where Cc  0, it is instructive, to briey consider the
derivation of the capital ight threshold where Cc can be arbitrarily dierent from zero. Clearly, the policy-maker will
only complete the project if Y  e Y =
Cc
 which, in turn implies that the investor will not engage in capital ight i
Y  max
n
Y ; e Y
o
. Our model studies the case where the threat of capital ight is a substitute for the soft budget constraint
i.e. Y  e Y ,
(1 cw)
(1 )  Cc which requires that either Cc is low enough, an assumption we maintain throughout the paper.
11The solution to the bureaucrat's maximization problem stated above yields a direct relation between
bureaucrat eort e (via its impact on the productivity of the public infrastructure project) and the
investor's capital ight threshold Y (and cw). This relationship between the bureaucrat's eort e and the
investor's capital ight threshold Y is key to our analysis, and we summarize it in the proposition below.
Proposition 1. Under the assumption that  
f0()
f() < 2 for all  2 [0;1] and lim!1 f() > 0, the
bureaucrat's expected payo B(e;Y ) is concave in e and we have the following:
(i) the bureaucrat's eort e is non-decreasing (increasing at an interior solution) in the investor's
capital ight threshold Y (i.e. there is complementarity between e and Y ) if  
f0()
f() < 1.
(ii) bureaucrat's eort e is non-increasing (decreasing at an interior solution) in the investor's capital








The above proposition describes the key relationship of the paper - namely, the impact of an increased
likelihood of capital ight (a higher  Y ) on the quality of governance (e) in the host country. Dierences
in the ability, and willingness of foreign investors to liquidate and withdraw capital from the country can
have very dierent eects on the bureaucrat's incentives.
The proposition above outlines two possibilities - either the threat of capital ight helps discipline the
bureaucrat and improve governance (Proposition 1(i)) or it may have an adverse impact on the quality
of governance and even worsen matters (Proposition 1(ii)).10 We discuss each of these scenarios below:
(a) Capital Flight, Discipline and Good Governance: Governance was poor due to the inability of the
policymaker to credibly threaten the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat put in low eort because he was aware
that any threat by the policymaker to not complete the project was an empty one. However, what the
above proposition sketches out is that the threat of capital ight helps resolve this ineciency. This is
because if the investor can withdraw money relatively easily then the bureaucrat will be unable to earn
the rents from the continuation of the public project. Accordingly, this threat could help resolve the
ineciency in governance. However, the proposition emphasizes an important caveat. In particular, it
species that the threat of capital ight is eective as a discipline device so long as the probability of
capital ight is sensitive to changes in eort e or equivalently, investor beliefs are not too sensitive to small
changes in the structural environment, . In other words, changes in the probability distribution over the
10For simplicity, in the discussion that follows, we assume that bureaucrat is at an interior solution.
12productivity of the public good should be driven by the bureaucrat's eort and not be overwhelmed by
small changes in the external economic environment that are unrelated to bureaucrat eort.
(b) Capital Flight, (Over)Discipline and Inecient Governance: A striking implication of the above
proposition is that the threat of capital ight may have a negative impact on the bureaucrat's incentives.
For the threat of capital ight to be eective as an incentive device, it should be triggered o by low
eort on the part of the bureaucrat.
In contrast, if the probability of capital ight isn't sensitive to changes in eort e (or equivalently,
beliefs over  are sensitive to small changes in ), then this (over)discipline worsens governance. In other
words, incentives will be adversely eected if capital ight that punishes a country is unwarranted { in that
it gets triggered o despite a bureaucrat putting in high eort, due to changes in the external environment
(i.e. ). So the sensitivity of governance to a country's economic environment clearly depends on the
structure of its economy. We can capture this relationship in several ways, for example by examining the
relationship between governance (i.e. e) and the structure of the export sector (as summarized in the
nature of its density function f()). Alternatively, we can examine the impact of a global nancial or
currency crisis in directly exacerbating uncertainty. Given its central role in our analysis, we examine this
relationship between governance and various channels through which globalization may aect it next.
3.2.1 Globalization and Governance: Economic Fundamentals and State Capacity
Here we illustrate aspects of Proposition 1, by examining various channels through which globalization
aects governance. In our framework, the global economy has an impact on the incentives for good
governance by aecting the volatility of the overall economic environment. For instance, the global
economy can aect economic volatility through its impact on a country's revenue, foreign investment or
capital ight. However, the severity and nature of this impact is going to be a function of the structure
of the economy as well as the bureaucratic state capacity of its government. We examine these themes
below.
(i) Economic Structure, the Export Sector and Goverance: We are interested in a simple way to capture
an economy that has strong economic fundamentals in that it is less vulnerable to shocks from the global
economy. Accordingly, in what follows we use a simple channel to examine the relationship between
governance and the volatility of a country's economic environment - by focusing on the structure of its
export sector.
13In our framework, the global economy injects uncertainty on an investor's decision making, through its
impact on the revenue stream of the country's export sector. For instance, if a country is relatively poor
and exports primary products (mining or agricultural goods), then volatility in these commodity prices
can have a large impact. In contrast, as a country develops and becomes more structurally diversied,
so does its export sector (Imbs and Wacziarg(2003), Rodrik(2007)). This diversication and movement
into less volatile commodities, results in an export sector that is less subject to overall volatility, even if
individual products remain subject to idiosyncratic shocks. These structural characteristics are important,
because they restrict the shape the underlying density function f() and therefore, the ratio  
f0()
f() . As
the above proposition points out, whether the relationship between eort e and Y is one of a substitute
or a complement depends on  
f0()
f() . Accordingly, we may be interested in how the underlying density
function eects this key relationship.
For instance, consider the truncated exponential restricted to [0;1]. Observe that  
f0()
f() =  where
 > 0 and 1
 is the ratio of mean to variance of the (unrestricted) exponential distribution. Accordingly,
it follows that a country with a structurally diversied export sector will have a  that is suciently
small. In other words, if   1 , 1
  1 then  
f0()
f()  1 while if  > 1 , 1
 < 1 then  
f0()
f() > 1 over
non-null sets of . In the Appendix (Example 1), we show that there exists constants 0 < k1 < k2 such
that if 1
 < k1, bureaucrat eort is increasing in cw while if 1
 > k2 bureaucrat eort is decreasing in cw.
Remark 1: If shocks to the revenue from a country's export sector is described by a (truncated) exponential
distribution, then so long as the ratio of the average value of exports to their variance are (i) high enough,
the bureaucrat's eort will be decreasing in cw, i.e. the threat of capital ight will discipline the bureaucrat
and lead to good governance, (ii) low enough, the bureaucrat's eort will be increasing in cw, i.e. the threat
of capital ight will overdiscipline the bureaucrat and lead to inecient governance.
Indeed, in general we can show that outside of some special cases such as the uniform distribution,
the parameter  
f0()
f() , and hence the elasticity of beliefs over , can take on very dierent values.11
If  
f0()
f() > 2 then the bureaucrat's expected payo B(e;Y ) may be convex. Indeed in this situation,
we can expect that the bureaucrat's eort to change discontinuously in Y and hence increase discontin-
uously in cw. If the shocks to the revenue from a country's export sector is described by a (truncated)
exponential distribution, then so long as the ratio of the average value of exports to their variance is very
11For example, when f(:) is the normal distribution (with mean  and variance 





22 so that if  > 1, it follows that  
f0()
f()  1 while if  < 1 , there exists K > 0 such that if

2  K,  
f0()
f() > 1 over non-null sets of .
14low the bureaucrat's objective function will be convex in eort and will discontinuously jump up as cw is
increased. We elaborate on this in an example (Example 2) in the Appendix.
(ii) Globalization, Uncertainty and Governance: Here we examine the impact on bureaucrat eort when
there is greater uncertainty about the external environment . In a world where there is some degree of
nancial globalization, a banking or nancial crisis or currency crisis elsewhere in the world, can make
international investors nervous and make country vulnerable to capital ight - if some investors engage
in short-run withdrawal of money. For instance, while the Mexican nancial crisis of 1994 exacerbated
uncertainty in the global economy, it did so especially in Latin America - labeled the `Tequila' eect.
To model such a scenario, assume that beliefs over  are described by two possible probability density
functions f1(:) and f2(:) which satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property i.e.
f1()
f2() is increasing
in . In other words, the probability density functions f2(:) corresponds to a more adverse external





    (e) , where Fi(:) is the corresponding cumulative density function where i = 1;2. The
relationship between the bureaucrat's eort e and the beliefs over  is summarized in the proposition
below.
Proposition 2. There is an adverse impact on the quality of governance, when there is greater uncertainty
about the external environment, i.e. bureaucratic performance e is lower when beliefs over  are described
by f2(:) rather than f1(:), when f1(:) and f2(:) satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property.
Proof: See Appendix.
The above proposition highlights the key mechanism underlying the main results of the paper: greater
uncertainty over  unambiguously lowers the quality of governance by worsening the bureaucrat's incen-
tives. The proposition above shows that with greater uncertainty over  the probability of capital ight
becomes less sensitive to changes in eort e so that, unambiguously, the quality of governance declines.
In this case, even for a xed level of cw, the probability distribution over the productivity of the invest-
ment project is relatively more responsive to chance variations in the external environment rather than to
changes in the bureaucrat's eort. This proposition also suggests an empirical test of the key mechanism
of the paper. We describe this in Section 5 below.
Proposition 2 has a clear implication: when there is greater uncertainty in the global economy, the
push towards globalization (for e.g. a policy of reducing capital controls) will stop or slow down during this
period, because of the negative impact this greater global uncertainty has on the quality of governance.
15(iii) Globalization, State Capacity and Governance: A country's state capacity is the ability of the gov-
ernment policymaker to implement a range of policies (see Besley and Persson, 2011). Here we outline a
simple framework that helps us analyze aspects of country's bureaucratic state capacity.
Countries dier in the quality of their governance on a number of dimensions. However, a key aspect
is a government's ability to implement policies - the administrative competence of the bureaucracy. In
particular, the state capacity of a bureaucracy refers to the ability of the policymaker-government to
ensure that its ocials and bureaucrats are able to administratively execute the policies that have been
legislated. In other words contracting problems between the policymaker and the bureaucrat are likely
to have been resolved through some combination of explicit and implicit incentives.
When bureaucrat eort is contractible, the government will choose e subject to the participation
constraint:
    (e)  0:
As national welfare is strictly increasing in bureaucrat eort, in any solution to policy-maker's maximiza-
tion problem, the bureaucrat's participation constraint will bind. It follows that the maximum level of
eort consistent with the bureaucrat's participation constraint is emax =   1(). Accordingly, we assume
that a country with bureaucrat state capacity  as a situation where the policy-maker is able to commit
the bureaucrat to emax with probability , where  2 [0;1]. Specically, if the policy-maker observes an
eort level dierent from emax, he is able to re the bureaucrat with probability . Of course, we should
expect most countries to have less than perfect bureaucrat state-capacity.
In our analysis so far, we have assumed implicitly that there is no bureaucrat state-capacity, i.e.
 = 0. However, in order to study the implications of our framework for empirical analysis, we revisit
this assumption here.
The following proposition states the link between cw,  and bureaucrat eort:
Proposition 3. Under the assumption that  
f0()
f() < 1 for all  2 [0;1], we have the following:
(i) an increase in state capacity  and greater globalization (lower cw) are both substitutes of each
other and help achieve good governance
(ii) for a xed degree of globalization cw, the bureaucrat eort choice is increasing in state capacity .
Proof: See Appendix.
The above proposition again highlights the key mechanism underlying the main results of the paper:
greater state capacity unambiguously lowers the reliance of the policy-maker on the threat of capital
16ight to maintain a high quality of governance.
The above proposition implies that for a given level of globalization (as captured by cw), greater state
capacity improves the overall quality of governance. As with Proposition 2, this proposition also suggests
a direct empirical test of the key mechanism through which globalization aects governance studied in
this paper. We describe this in Section 5 below.
4 Governance and Globalization: Equilibrium and Welfare Analysis
We now complete our analysis of the equilibrium to the game and sketch out the implications of globaliza-
tion for the policymaker's welfare. Observe that this being a sequential game, in what follows we analyze
the equilibrium backwards. We have already described the policymaker's project completion decision,
the foreign investor's capital ight decision as well as the bureaucrat's eort decision. However, for a
complete analysis we need to further examine the conditions under which the government launches the
public infrastructure project and foreign investors invest capital into the investment project in the rst
place. We now describe and analyze the second-best welfare benchmark below.
4.1 The Welfare Benchmark with Contractible Eort ( = 1): the \Capture" Eect
We begin by analyzing the benchmark case when the policymaker is able to commit the government
bureaucracy to a specic action. This is equivalent to a case where the administrative state capacity
 = 1 and the government-policymaker is able to commit the bureaucrat to take the high eort action
(see Besley and Persson, 2011). At the same time, we should keep in mind that investors cannot commit
to retain their investment in the country, especially if the cost of international capital mobility are
low.12 Therefore, we describe as our welfare benchmark the second-best case, where by assumption - the
bureaucracy can commit to take an action but investors cannot pre-commit to retain their capital in the
country.
Accordingly, when bureaucrat eort is contractible, the policy-maker's expected payo W is obtained







12The only possible exception is the case, when the currency of the country in question acts a reserve currency for the
foreign investor.
17where expected returns to the investment are given by Y = e and  is the share of total output that
accrues to domestic factors. Recollect that the bureaucrat's participation constraint is     (e)  0.
Note that for any solution to the policy-maker's maximization problem, the bureaucrat's participation
constraint will bind. It follows that the maximum level of eort consistent with the bureaucrat's partici-
pation constraint is emax =   1().
The representative investor will invest if and only if the expected payo from investing in the country
( ~ R) is greater than the opportunity cost of doing so i.e. i












The rst term on the left hand side is the expected payo to the foreign investor from not withdrawing
investment out of the country (since the return on the investment project is expected to be suciently
high). The second term is the investor's payo from pulling investment out of the country (this occurs
with probability F( Y
emax)).
The policymaker faces the decision of whether to incur the up-front cost of initiating the public
project. If successful, such a public project boosts private returns and may help attract foreign investment.
Accordingly, the government will initiate the project if and only if the expected payo from doing so is








The share of the total output that accrues to the policymaker-government is given by  and the term
within brackets is the expected project return when the bureaucrat puts in eort emax, conditional on the
private investment being retained in the project till its maturity.
Consider the impact of a change in cw on the policy-maker's payo and foreign investor's payo
respectively. As mentioned earlier we can interpret this as a change in the degree of global integra-
tion/segregation arising out of a change in capital controls or the degree of globalization - either of which
aect the transactions costs of moving capital across borders. When eort is contractible, the direct
impact on the quality of governance as captured through the bureaucrat's incentives - the \discipline"- is
absent. However, a high cost of withdrawing capital, makes the policymaker-government less vulnerable
to the adverse consequence of capital ight in case of low project return. As the cost of completing the
project is zero, the government's expected payo unambiguously goes up as cw goes up in value. However,
a higher cost of withdrawing capital reduces the option value to the foreign investor of not investing in
18the country. This is because the investor's investment is likely to be captured by the host country, as the
investor is unlikely to be able to exercise his option to withdraw capital when the return on the investment
project is low. This \capture" eect of a higher ex-ante cost of capital withdrawal has, as we shall show,
an unambiguously negative eect on the returns from investing in the project in the rst place.
In other words, once capital has been invested into a country, this \capture" eect makes the host
country policymaker better o precisely because it limits the ability of the investors to exercise their
\option" to exit the country. Notice that there is a direct distributional aspect to the \capture" eect -
since it has very dierent payo implications for the investors as against the policymaker-government.
Proposition 4. Under the assumption that bureaucrat eort is contractible, we have the following char-
acterization of foreign investor and policy-maker welfare:
(i) the foreign investor's ex-ante payo is decreasing in cw and there exists a cuto value  c  0 so
that the investor invests only if cw   c.
(ii) the policy-maker's expected payo is increasing in cw and there exists a cuto value ^ c  0 so that
the government is willing to start the project only if cw  ^ c.
(iii) the project will undertaken i ^ c   c.
Proof: See Appendix.
Therefore, when  c > 0, even when bureaucrat eort is contractible but the investor cannot commit not
to engage in capital ight if the (observed) bureaucrat eort is high, there is a role for capital controls.
4.2 Welfare Analysis with Non-contractible bureaucrat Eort ( = 0)
We now describe the equilibrium and carry out the welfare analysis in the case that interests us - namely,
where the policymaker-government is unable to commit the bureaucrat to commit to take a specied
action (i.e. the administrative state capacity  = 0). The representative investor will invest if and only
if the expected payo from investing in the country ( ~ R) is greater than the opportunity cost of doing so
i.e. i












The interpretation of the investors ex-ante payo is exactly the same as in the case with contractible
bureaucrat eort with e in place of emax.








The interpretation of the investors ex-ante payo is exactly the same as in the case with contractible
bureaucrat eort with e in place of emax (see equation (5)).
We want to characterize how the decision to invest and/or the decision to initiate the project is aected
by changes in cw. With non-contractible bureaucrat eort (i.e. zero state capacity), in addition to the
capture eect, there is the \ incentive" eect namely de
dcw.
Consider rst, the case where globalization has a positive discipline eect. Here de
dcw < 0 and the
bureaucrat's optimal eort choice e is decreasing in the cost of withdrawing capital. Accordingly, the
\discipline" eect and the \capture" eect, both go in the same direction so that foreign investor's
expected payo from investing in the country increases with globalization. However, a rise in cw, makes
the threat of capital ight more costly and weakens the \disciplining" eect of globalization. Indeed
this can more than oset the positive impact of global segregation on the policymaker's ability to keep
investment despite a bad external shock (i.e. the \capture" eect). Accordingly, globalization (i.e. a
change in cw) may not have a monotonic impact on the government's expected payo.
Having discussed the impact of globalization of short term capital movements, we are now in a position
to examine its impact on host country welfare. We do this by integrating the policymaker's decision to
launch the public project with the foreign investor's investment decision. As in the preceding discussion,
we capture the extent of integration of a country's capital markets, in a particularly simple manner - a
reduction in the cost of a short-run liquidation and withdrawal of capital from the host country.13
The impact on overall welfare will be a combination of the impact of a change in the degree of global
integration (i.e. change in cw) on both the foreign investor's expected payo (i.e. ~ R) and the policymaker's
payo W. Indeed, as suggested by the preceding analysis, the overall impact on host country welfare
occurs through the working of the \discipline" and \capture" eects. The preferences of the foreign
investor and the policymaker are aligned when it comes to the \discipline" eect. Both investors and
the policymaker would like to provide the appropriate incentives to ensure good governance. However,
as mentioned above, the preferences of the policymaker and the foreign investors are in conict when it
13We should point out that while our analysis does not distinguish between a change in the cost of withdrawing capital
(i.e. change in cw) that is driven by technological-environmental forces or those driven by a government's policy choices.
However, for the moment, we assume that the government can choose the value of cw subject to a lower bound cw.
20comes to the \capture" eect. For a summary see Figure 1 in the Appendix.
The following proposition compares investor and policy-maker welfare with non-contractible bureau-
crat eort to the second-best welfare benchmark with contractible bureaucrat eort:
Proposition 5. Under the assumption that bureaucrat eort is non-contractible, we have the following
characterization of foreign investor and policy-maker welfare:
(i) If a decrease in cw improves bureaucrat governance (i.e. positive \disciplining" eect), then glob-
alization (a smaller cw) increases both national and investor welfare if dW
dcw < 0.
(ii) If a decrease in cw worsens bureaucrat governance (i.e. negative \disciplining" eect), then na-
tional welfare always worsens with globalization. Furthermore, if d ~ R
dcwjcw=0 > 0, then a marginal increase
in cw can improve both investor and national welfare. i.e. it is a Pareto improvement.
(iii) When there is a disciplining eect of the threat of capital ight on bureaucrat eort, relative to
the second best benchmark, lower capital controls will improve both investor and government welfare.
(iv) When there is an overdisciplining eect of the threat of capital ight on bureaucrat eort, relative
to the second best benchmark, lower capital controls will lower both investor and government welfare.
Proof: See Appendix.
The proposition above describes that the impact on welfare of a reduction in the short-run cost of
withdrawing capital is due to external shocks (or other changes that are not a function of the decision of
the domestic policymaker). However, our framework is equally relevant, if we are analyzing the welfare
impact of a reduction in cw arising out of a policy decision - such as a reduction in capital controls. In
terms of our framework, the only dierence is that at stage 1 (refer back to the timing of the game in
Section 2), the government chooses cw (the level of capital controls) rather than merely observe cw. The
fact that this choice of a cw may involve a dead-weight loss will not alter the qualitative nature of any of
results summarized in the preceding Propositions.
Our results throw light on one of the most contentious issues in international economic policymaking
- the role of capital controls. A variety of arguments have been put forward for the imposition (or
removal) of capital controls. However, ours is the rst analytical treatment which looks at a very distinct
channel - namely, the impact of capital controls on the quality of a country's governance. Our analysis
suggests that if a country's economy is vulnerable to shocks from the global economy (i.e. suers from
`overdisciplining'), there could be a role for capital controls. Equally, there is a strong argument in favor
of reducing capital controls - the `disciplining' of nations clearly works, albeit some of the time.
21Given our analysis in the preceeding section (Remark 1) taken together with our preceding discussion
on the impact of globalization (decrease in cw) on national welfare and the payos of the foreign investor:
Remark 2: (i) Globalization (i.e. lower capital controls) will improve both investor and government
welfare relative to the second-best welfare benchmark, so long as the country has a suciently structurally
diversied export sector, i.e. if the revenue from the country's export sector is described by a (trun-
cated) exponential distribution and the ratio of the country's average value of exports to their variance is
suciently high.
(ii) Globalization (i.e. lower capital controls) will lower both investor and government welfare, relative
to the second-best welfare benchmark, so long as the country's export sector is insuciently diversied,
i.e. if the revenue from the country's export sector is described by a (truncated) exponential distribution
and the ratio of the country's average value of exports to their variance is suciently low.
While our results provide ammunition for both critics as well as advocates of easing up international
capital mobility, we suggest that our results be treated very cautiously and not read as policy recommen-
dation. This is especially true since we have completely sidestepped the political economy considerations
that may hijack capital control policy.
5 Globalization and Governance: Some Evidence
Our theoretical framework generates a rich set of predictions. In this section we provide evidence consis-
tent with some of our predictions. At the outset we should emphasize that the evidence should be treated
as suggestive and interpreted cautiously - for reasons we elaborate on later in the section.
However, before we summarize our main predictions, we recollect that a country with state capacity
of  implements the rst-best with probability  (Proposition 3). Therefore, we should not expect that
countries with strong institutions of governance will suer from the ineciencies that we have spelt out
in our analysis - and this should be accounted for in our empirical analysis below. Keeping this in mind,
we begin by summarizing some of the key predictions:
A. Uncertainty and Governance: (a) The quality of governance is adversely aected by greater uncer-
tainty in the economic environment (Proposition 2). This is because with greater uncertainty over , the
probability of capital ight becomes less sensitive to changes in e, resulting in an unambiguous decline
in the quality of governance. (b) The impact of greater uncertainty in the economic environment will be
decreasing in the bureaucrat state-capacity of the country  (Proposition 3).
22B. Governance and Globalization (Capital Controls): Countries with high bureaucratic state capacity
should (on average) have lower capital controls. In particular, a reduction in the cost of nancial global-
ization cw (e.g. lowering of capital controls) should be associated with improved measures of governance.
This is because globalization results in the quality of governance improving in some countries and wors-
ening in others. However, we should only expect a government to relax capital controls if doing so has a
positive impact on governance.
In what follows, while we provide some suggestive evidence on both sets of predictions, our focus
is on A. This is for two reasons. First, we do not have plausible measures of a change in the cost of
moving capital across countries, cw. The only measure that is reliably available is the size of capital
controls - an endogenous choice variable of the government. Second and more importantly, we focus on
A, because doing so throws light on the precise mechanism emphasized in the paper - in particular, how
an exogenous change in economic uncertainty (possibly caused by globalization), can worsen incentives
for good governance. However, any empirical design that tries to study this issue faces several challenges.
First, we should be able to identify a sudden and unexpected event that results in greater uncertainty
about the economic environment in a large number of countries. Second, this change in the economic
environment should be independent of the actions of the bureaucrat-policymaker in the country that we
are studying.
We argue that the Mexican currency crisis of 1994 provides a possible setting for a natural experiment
that can help throw light on the impact of the greater uncertainty on the quality of governance. This
currency crisis increased uncertainty and raised the fear of contagion across a number of countries that
were perceived by investors to be `similar' to Mexico - the so called \Tequila eect" on other countries in
the region (see Dornbusch, Park and Claessens, 2000).14 Further, it is plausible that the initial trigger for
the Mexican crisis was not the actions of policymakers and bureaucrats in countries other than Mexico. 15
Indeed, it is because of this that we are interested in the impact of this increased uncertainty on countries
other than Mexico. Our main hypothesis is that countries that were perceived to be similar to Mexico
and had poor bureaucratic state capacity, were more likely to be aected by the increased uncertainty
14Indeed, Glick and Rose (1999) argued that following the Mexican crisis there was considerable uncertainty as \speculative
attacks on ther Latin American countries occurred immediately. The most prominent targets of the `Tequila Hangover' were
Latin American countries, especially Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela." For a good summary of the eects of the
Mexican crisis and its aftermath see Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) and Kaminsky and Reihart (2000).
15It matters less whether this fear of contagion (the Tequila eect) was driven by fundamentals or whether it was irrational
investor perceptions.
23due to the Mexican currency crisis. It is important that we distinguish between subjective contagion and
real economic contagion across this set of countries. This is because according to our theory, we should
expect an impact from greater uncertainty (in this case, greater uncertainty driven by external shocks)
on bureaucratic governance under the following two conditions. First, that this increased uncertainty was
partially due to greater subjective (as against real economic) contagion. Second, we should only expect
the increased uncertainty to aect governance if the country had poor bureaucratic state capacity in the
rst place.
Data: As a rst step for our empirical analysis, we need a measure of a country's bureaucratic perfor-
mance. We have no direct measure of the quality of bureaucratic governance available across countries.
Fortunately, we have survey data on `bureaucratic quality' available for a large number of countries from
Political Risk Services for the period 1984-1997. This is an index that is increasing in bureaucratic quality
and has the range from 6 to 0.2 in our data. Second, we need an exogenous measure of the perceived sim-
ilarity of a country to Mexico. Accordingly, we use the weighted genetic closeness of a country to Mexico
as a proxy for the extent of the expected `contagion' from Mexico (see Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). The
measure ranges from 1,835 to 14.14 in our data. Countries which are seen as similar to Mexico are more
likely to be aected by contagion in nancial markets. Contagion increases market volatility (Corsetti et
al., 2010) and is therefore likely to cause investment decisions to be less tied to bureaucrat eort. Third,
a measure of a country's bureaucratic state capacity is the strength of its institutions - where a measure
of Protection against Expropriation is the most widely used measure. To facilitate interpretation we ip
the index, so that 10 represents the poorest institutions, and 0 represents the best. In order to minimize
concerns of endogeneity, following Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001), we use settler mortality as
our instrument for a country's overall bureaucratic state capacity. 16
Empirical Specication: According to our theoretical framework, greater uncertainty in the economic
environment should worsen bureaucratic performance, but only when the incomplete contractual structure
exists between the government and the bureaucrat (i.e. low bureaucrat state capacity). However, since
the uncertainty from the Mexican crisis is more likely to aect countries perceived to be similar to Mexico,
our empirical specication takes the following form 17
16Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson show that settler mortality correlates highly with Risk of Appropriation, so our rst stage
should be similar in that respect, however, we have 2 endogenous variables because of our dierence-in-dierences design.
Also, we must reconsider the exclusion restriction assumption, as our second stage is dierent. However, we see no reason
for settler mortality to impact on bureaucratic quality other than through its impact on institutions.
17This can be seen as a triple-dierence design.
24e
ct = c + 1[Contagionct  SettlerMortalityc] + 2[SettlerMortalityc  Post94t]
+ 3[Contagionct] + 4[Post94t] +  Y earFE + Controls + ct
Where the subscript c denotes countries and t denotes year and otherwise standard time-invariant
variables are omitted because we estimate a xed-eects model (ie. country institutions as measured by
settler mortality, genetic closeness to Mexico, and their interaction are all dropped in the xed-eects
specication). Post94 is a dummy variable for observations between 1995 and 1997, inclusive. Contagion
equals the interaction between genetic closeness to Mexico and Post94. Furthermore in our model, the
impact of uncertainty on governance is completely absent for countries with no incomplete contractual
problem between the policymaker and the bureaucrat. Accordingly, in some of our specications (column
2 onwards) we increase the exibility of the specication by allowing countries with a perfect state capacity
index 18 to react dierently to the treatment by interacting our treatment with a dummy for perfect state
capacity. If this feature of our model is correct this improvement in specication should improve the
precision of our estimates.
Results: The reduced form equation above is estimated with and without a number of controls -
from GDP per capita, military regimes, democracy, population, trade with Mexico, and openness to
trade. While the results are robust to each, our preferred specications do not include GDP per capita,
exports, debt, trade with Mexico or openness to trade, since they are arguably endogenous variables. In
robustness and falsication tests we therefore omit these controls. At the same time, we want to be sure
that economic fundamentals are not driving our results, so it's important to ensure robustness to variables
like imports and exports with Mexico, which measures how exposed each country was to real economic
eects of the crisis. Table 1 shows the main results in a reduced form specication. The coecient of
interest is 1, which corresponds to the interaction between settler mortality and the contagion variable
(which equals genetic distance if the observation is post-crisis). In all the specications that we tested,
we obtain a negative coecient, that is robust to a wide variety of controls. This is consistent with
our theoretical prediction that bureaucratic performance is negatively aected by the increased threat of
capital ight - so long as bureaucratic state capacity was imperfect and the country was perceived to be
similar to Mexico. Furthermore, our theory predicts that countries with perfect bureaucrat state-capacity
18The state capacity index we used to construct this binary variable is the sum of the PSR corruption, rule of law and
bureaucracy indices
25Table 1: Reduced-form Estimates of Contagion on Bureaucratic Quality
Dependant Variable: Bureaucratic Quality
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contagion x Settler Mortality -0.144* -0.597*** -0.622*** -0.627*** -0.537*** -0.557***
(0.0815) (0.129) (0.126) (0.124) (0.140) (0.147)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Non-interacted treatments N Y Y Y Y Y
Di. reaction if high st.cap. N Y Y Y Y Y
Military Regimes N N Y Y Y Y
Democracy N N N Y Y Y
GDP per capita N N N N Y Y
External Debt N N N N Y Y
Exports N N N N Y Y
Openness to Trade N N N N N Y
Interdependence with Mexico N N N N N Y
Observations 616 616 616 616 528 528
R-squared 0.074 0.106 0.156 0.175 0.225 0.243
Number of countries 56 56 56 56 49 49
Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. The time period included in the sample is restricted to 1987-1998. The
dependent variable in all columns is Bureaucratic Quality. All models include country xed eects and year xed eects.
Contagion x Settler Mortality refers to the the interaction between Post94, Settler Mortality and Closeness to Mexico.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
will react very dierently to a crisis. Indeed, our results are reassuring on this count, since when we allow
these countries to react dierently to the crisis (column 2-6), there is a dramatic improvement of the
precision of our estimates. We can also discount the possibility that economic fundamentals are driving
our estimates based on this table. The estimate is robust to our rst of two checks on this potential issue:
including the variables intended to control for the exposure to the crisis based on fundamentals; GDP per
capita, openness to trade, external debt, imports and exports with Mexico and total exports.
Of course, the results above are only the reduced form estimates. So we may worry whether settler
mortality is an adequate instrument for the institutional state capacity of a country. To further ensure that
the settler mortality term that we use is an adequately proxy for institutional quality, we also report two-
stage least squares results (see Appendix for details). Here the controls are the same as in the reduced form
version of the model. In column 1, because both instruments are signicant predictors of both endogenous
variables, we might have an under-identication issue. However, as can be seen from columns 2-7, under-
identication is no longer a concern once we correctly specify the model to treat countries with a perfect
26state capacity dierently. Otherwise, the rst stage is consistent with expectations. The instruments that
are expected to predict the endogenous variables are all highly signicant with the expected signs. The
second stage is also consistent with all previous results. Each correctly specied model is highly signicant
and with the expected sign. The coecient of interest in the rst (misspecied) model is insignicant,
which is unsurprising given the potentially under-identied rst stage results.
We carry out further robustness checks. One concern with this framework is that we can't be positive
that we're picking up the eect of the crisis specically rather than normal trend eects. In other words,
this can be seen as a dierence-in-dierences design, which relies on the identifying assumption that the
treatment and control groups are not already diverging before treatment. To alleviate this concern we
run a series of placebos, moving the year of treatment to various dierent points in time. Observe from
Table 4 that this is not a concern since each placebo is close to zero and highly insignicant .
As a further test of robustness, we examine serial correlation as suggested in Bertrand, Duo and
Mullinaithan (2004). We have 56 countries in our sample, so we correct for serial correlation using
the two relevant (given our sample size) suggestions: clustering and collapsing the data to fewer time
periods 19. Table 3 shows the reduced form and 2SLS results using the two-way cluster-robust standard
errors proposed by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2011). This allows for clustering in two non-nested
dimensions, and we do so on countries and years. While we present results without the potentially
endogenous `exposure' controls, their inclusion does not change the qualitative nature of the results. We
nd that our results are robust to clustering, suggesting that serial correlation is not driving our results.
Despite the fact that our results seem quite robust, there are reasons to be cautious. Our rst
concern is that the possibility that the Mexican crisis results in adverse real economic contagion eects
may result in a neighboring country's fundamentals being aected in a way that resources available to
the bureaucracy are curtailed. For example, the crisis results in a sharp drop in Mexican demand for
imports or FDI towards other Latin American countries20 - i.e. economic contagion (Rigobon, 2006). This
economic contagion may have an adverse impact on the budgetary situation in these countries and result
in fewer resources being devoted to the bureaucracy and institutions of governance. Accordingly, failure
19The third suggestion is block-bootstrapping, but as noted by Bertrand, Duo and Mullainathan a large number of
observations is required. In fact they note in a working paper version that 50 observations would not be sucient for the
block-bootstrap to perform well and we have only 56
20We control for the former using controls for trade with Mexico directly in the main results, while the latter was tested
in a falsication test similar to table 5, except with FDI as the dependent variable. We do not present results on the FDI
falsication test, however we can rule out that a decrease in FDI occurred among our treatment group after treatment
27to control for changes in economic fundamentals due to the crisis, could represent an omitted variable,
which might bias our estimates. However, any empirical strategy should account for the challenge that
arises from the endogeniety of changes in the budgetary expenditure. We therefore take a two pronged
approach. First, we carry out a falsication exercise by testing our model on government expenditures
to see if the crisis reduced government budgets. Here, if we found a signicant decrease in government
budgetary resources, it could be argued that it was this drop in resources that was causing a drop in
bureaucrat performance, rather than the increased uncertainty. Reassuringly, the crisis does not have any
signicant impact on government budgets among countries similar to Mexico with low state capacity. We
report these results in Table 5 columns 5-8. Not only is the estimate not signicant, if anything it has the
opposite sign. This result is consistent with our previous specications that show a country's change in
bureaucratic quality is not being driven by its direct economic exposure to the crisis. While these controls
are potentially endogenous, we include them only in the last column of Table 1 to show that are results
are not being driven by GDP per capita, openness to trade, imports and exports with Mexico, external
debt and exports.
The second main concern that we have is that our measure of bureaucratic performance is a subjective
one. In particular, while this measure is widely used, the main worry may well be that it is subject to
`contamination' since it based on the perceptions of managers and investors surveyed. The concern
is that there may be no actual change in bureaucratic quality, and instead the crisis merely caused a
change in perceptions of bureaucratic quality. Given the absence of an alternative reliable, objective
measures of bureaucratic performance that are easily available for a cross section of countries, this is
a dicult challenge, which we address indirectly. To assess whether this is a signicant concern, we
run our model through a falsication test using a variable we believe should be similarly aected by
a perceptions bias, but for which there is no expected real eect. The dependent variable used is a
bureaucrat corruption measure from the same survey as our bureaucratic quality measure, and generated
using the same methodology. The idea is that because we expect no real change in real corruption, but
we do expect perceptions of both bureaucratic quality and corruption to be highly correlated, we can
attribute changes in the corruption estimate to the size of the bias. The success of this falsication design
relies on the claim that a perceptions bias will be highly correlated among all measures of how well a
government functions.
The results of this falsication test can be seen in Table 5, columns 1-4. Indeed the estimates are
28close to 0 and insignicant. While not reported, we also run a similar exercise on perceptions from
Heritage Foundation, and the results were similar. Transparency International and World Bank also have
perception based measures, however they don't include data from before the crisis, so these measures
could unfortunately not be tested. However, there is no impact of the crisis on any of our falsication
specications, indicating that the concern that our results for bureaucratic quality results are driven by
biased perceptions should be minimal. The fact that we do not nd any signicant impact of the Mexican
crisis on measures of perceived corruption, increases our condence that changes in bureaucratic quality
were real changes, and not biased by false perceptions.
The results described above suggest that the unexpected increase in uncertainty in nancial markets
exacerbated the threat of capital ight and adversely aected governance, especially in those countries
which had relatively weak institutional state capacity. This eect is robust to the inclusion of many
controls, including measures of current development, and survives placebo analysis. Further, the two-
stage least squares analysis is consistent with the reduced form analysis. Moreover, while the results from
our falsication tests were reassuring, they were not conclusive. Accordingly, given that we lack direct
measures of bureaucratic performance, we argue that the results be interpreted cautiously and treated as
suggestive.
We now briey sketch out some suggestive evidence that shows the relationship between governance
and capital controls sketched out in B above. The globalization of capital can occur due to changes
in the policy environment (e.g. a reduction in capital controls) or a function of technological changes
(e.g. the information technology revolution). Indeed, both these factors have been responsible for the
increase in the movement of international capital over the last couple of decades. However, the empirical
literature on nancial globalization on governance has been handicapped not just by the absence of any
(exogenous) measure of the changes in (technology related) cost of moving capital across borders, but
also the endogeneity of changes in the policy of capital controls. Accordingly, over here our aims are quite
modest. We limit our discussion to providing some suggestive evidence in support of our claims. While
suggestive, our results are no more than that - since issues of endogeneity and selection remain a concern.
As a rst step, consider Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6. This provides conditional correlations that suggest
that a weakening of capital controls is associated with better governance as captured by improvements in
bureaucratic quality, i.e. the coecient is negative. Of course, this correlation is likely driven by countries
that do not relax capital controls because they fear the adverse impact on bureaucrat governance (ie.
29selection bias). Recollect that our theoretical framework suggests that the eect on governance from a
change in capital controls may on average be close to zero, as positive and negative eects are possible.
In column 6 of Table 6 we attempt to control for the selection bias which may be driving columns 5
and 6. If those countries with poor institutional quality are those least likely to proceed with capital
control relaxation, then the institutional quality variable will be correlated with the selection bias. If
our theoretical prediction is correct, the inclusion of a variable correlated with the selection eect should
drive the estimate towards zero. Indeed this is precisely what we see, as there is a reduction of the size
of the estimate towards zero in column 6. While consistent with our theoretical predictions, these results
are quite possibly driven by some omitted variable.
6 Conclusion
The globalization and integration of the world economy over the past few decades has led to dramatic
changes in the pattern of capital ows - especially to developing countries. A number of commentators
have pointed out both the promise and the perils of increased (though more volatile) capital ows. In
this paper we take a rst step in examining the implications of this globalization of capital on the quality
of governance. Despite the simplicity of our framework, our results were quite striking. By exacerbating
the threat of capital ight, globalization had the potential to `discipline' errant governments into enacting
ecient policies. However, this disciplining stick of the global capital market was not perfect. The threat
of unwarranted capital ight could also weaken incentives and `indiscipline' governments, especially so
long as the government was unable to impose capital controls.
It is dicult to think of institutional mechanisms that can credibly commit governments to behaving
in an ecient manner, especially in developing countries - where the state's bureaucratic capacity is
relatively weak. However, our analysis suggests that we should be cautious in presuming that the forces
of globalization will in and of themselves provide a simple mechanism to discipline governments and
improve governance. All countries face the prospect of indisciplined governments. However, this problem
in particularly acute in developing countries because as argued by North(1990, pp57), such countries
lack \...a mechanism to provide the information necessary to know when punishment is required". Our
analysis suggests that while such a mechanism might end up arriving as a by-product of the process of
globalization, integration and technological change - its impact may be uncertain.
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bureaucrat's objective function is (strictly) concave in e if f0() + 2f() > 0,  2 [0;1] or equivalently,
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Example 1 (The truncated exponential)
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so that as long as 1   Y
e , e  Y the bureaucrat's eort is increasing in cw. As e  1, as long as

1   1 or 1
  1
1  the bureaucrat's eort is increasing in cw.
On the other hand if e > Y , the bureaucrat's eort choice is decreasing in cw. Let  (e) = ce. Using









35To summarize: as long as the ratio to mean to variance is low enough, the bureaucrat's eort eis
increasing in cw; further, as long as, the ratio of mean to variance is high enough eis decreasing in cw.
Example 2 (Non-concave expected payos B(e;Y ))
If  
f0()
f() > 2 over a non-null set of , then the bureaucrats expected payos B(e;Y ) needn't be
concave in e. In this case, rst-order conditions may no longer be valid in characterizing e. How does e
depend on Y (and hence, cw) in this case?
To x matters, we will focus on the case with corner solutions and assume that  (e) = ce. In this case,
e = 1 when
@B(1;Y )
@e = f(Y )Y > c. As f(Y )Y is decreasing in Y whenever  
Y f0(Y )
f(Y ) > 2, it follows that
there exists a threshold value of ~ Y such that whenever Y  ~ Y , e = 1 and Y > ~ Y , there is a discontinuous
jump of bureaucrat's eort from e = 1 to an interior value strictly less than one.
To summarize: that the bureaucrat's eort could decreasing discontinuously in Y , and hence increase
discontinuously in cw, when the bureaucrat's expected utility is non-concave in own eort is a robust
possibility. 
Proof of Proposition 2
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@e . Let e
idenote the optimal choice of eort corresponding to the objective function Bi(e;Y ). Then,
it follows that e
2  e
1 with strict inequality at an interior solution.
Proof of Proposition 3
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It follows that when  = 0 (the case studied so far), without loss of generality, the bureaucrat




. When  = 1 (high state capacity) the bureaucrat will choose emax when

1   F(Y )

   (1). Note that when cw = 0, F(Y ) = 1 and when cw = 1, F(Y ) = 0 and

1   F(Y )

is increasing and continuous in cw so that there exists a value of cw, 0 < b cw < 1, such that whenever
cw  b cw, the bureaucrat chooses eort emax.
Moreover, by duality, (1   )








) is decreasing in . Moreover, (1   )F( Y
e(Y ;)) 
F(Y ) is decreasing in Y (as long as 1 > Y
e
de
dY see the proof of Proposition 5 below) so that as  decreases,
as by assumption  
f0()
f() < 1 for all  2 [0;1], cw has to go up in order to ensure that the bureaucrat
continues to choose eort emax.




, note that eort is increasing in cw
whenever  
f0()
f() < 1 for all  2 [0;1]. 
Proof of Proposition 4:














. In this case, the investor's expected payo ~ R attains a maximum
when it is costless to withdraw short-term capital from a country, i.e. cw = 0. Therefore, there exists a
cuto value  c  0 so that the investor invests only if cw   c.












37The government's expected payo W attains a maximum when short-term capital is never withdrawn
from a country, i.e. cw = 1. Therefore, there exists a cuto value ^ c  0 so that the government is willing
to start the project only if cw  ^ c.
Clearly, when 0  ^ c   c, the investment project will be undertaken and the government will set
cw =  c. 
Proof of Proposition 5:
By computation, note that the derivative of ~ R with respect to cw, taking into account the incentive
eect on bureaucrat eort, is given by the equation
d ~ R
dcw













There are two distinct eects on the investor's expected payo ~ R from investing in the project as the
cost of withdrawing capital increases. First, increasing the cost of withdrawing capital impacts on the
bureaucrat's incentive to put in eort - this is the \discipline"eect. The impact of this eect is captured














dcw < 0, d ~ R
dcw < 0. In this case, the investor's expected payo ~ R attains a maximum
when it is costless to withdraw short-term capital from a country, i.e. cw = 0. Therefore, there exists a
cuto value c  0 so that the investor invests only if cw  c. When de
dcw > 0, the bureaucrat's optimal
eort choice e is increasing in the cost of withdrawing capital. In this case the \discipline" eect and
the \capture" eects go in opposite directions. In this case, ~ R may not be monotone in cw. In particular,
due to the fact that globalization may have a negative impact on the bureaucrat's eort, there could be
regions in [0;1] where the expected return to foreign investment ~ R, is increasing in cw. Let c denote the
minimum value of cw for which the investor is indierent between investing in the project or investing
the money outside the country.
It follows that when de
dcw < 0, c <  c and when de
dcw > 0, c >  c so that relative to second-best welfare
benchmark, the foreign investor has a lower tolerance for capital controls when there is a disciplining eect
of the threat of capital ight and a higher tolerance for capital controls when there is an overdisciplining
eect of the threat of capital ight.
We now turn to the payo of the government-policymaker. By computation, note that the derivative




















38Consider the impact of a change in cw. There are two eects on the expected payo to the government-
policymaker W, as the cost of short-run capital withdrawal goes up. First, is the direct impact on the
quality of governance as captured through the bureaucrat's incentives - the \discipline"- this can be
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dcw < 0. Therefore, this second term makes the host
country policymaker better o21 precisely because it limits the ability of the investors to exercise their
\option" to exit the country.
Therefore, once we take both of these eects into account, the impact of globalization on the gov-
ernment's payo is the following. An increase in the cost of withdrawing short-term capital, results in a
higher government payo so long as the bureaucrat is being \overdisciplined". In this case lower levels of
global integration by reducing the threat of unwarranted capital ight, improve the bureaucrat's incen-
tives. In other words dW
dcw > 0 whenever de
dcw > 0, since in this case both the incentive and capture eects
go in the same direction. In this case, the government's expected payo W attains a maximum when
short-term capital is never withdrawn from a country, i.e. cw = 1. Therefore, there exists a cuto value
~ c  0 so that the government is willing to start the project only if cw  ~ c.
In contrast, if the bureaucrat's incentives were such that he was being `underdisciplined', then lower
levels of global integration would have a negative eect on his incentive to put in eort. Therefore, when
de
dcw < 0 a weakening of the \discipline" eect occurs when capital ight is made costly for the foreign
investor. Indeed this can more than oset the positive impact of global segregation on the policymaker's
ability to keep investment despite a bad external shock (i.e. the \capture" eect). Accordingly, glob-
alization (i.e. a change in cw) may not have a monotonic impact on the government's expected payo.
21In the appendix we show that
d Y
e








39Let ~ c  0 denote the minimum value of cw for which the government is indierent between starting the
project and not starting the project at all.
By computation, it follows that, when de
dcw > 0, ~ c < ^ c and when de
dcw < 0, ~ c > ^ c so that relative to
second-best welfare benchmark, the policymaker has a higher incentive to impose capital controls when
there is an overdisciplining eect of the threat of capital ight and a lower incentive to impose capital
controls when there is a disciplining eect of the threat of capital ight.










Payo increasing in globalization:
lower cw increases payo due to
both the \incentive" eect and
\capture" eect
Ambiguity in payo: higher cw
lowers payo due to the negative
\incentive" eect but increases it
due to the increased \capture"




Ambiguity in payo: higher cw in-
creases payo due to the \incen-
tive" eect but reduces it due to
the \capture eect"
Payo decreasing in globalization:
higher cw increases payo due to
both the \incentive" eect (re-
duces overdisciplining) and In-
creases \capture eect"
d ~ R=dcw > or < 0? dW=dcw < 0
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Table 2: Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates of the Contagion Eect
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: First Stage (1) - Dependant Variable: Contagion x Poor Institutions
Contagion x Settler Mortality 0.454*** 0.716*** 0.708*** 0.709*** 0.611*** 0.559***
(0.0951) (0.153) (0.152) (0.152) (0.156) (0.157)
Settler Mortality x Post94 168.8* 22.73 27.29 16.79 157.7 231.02*
(95.57) (115.5) (115.3) (115.7) (124.8) (128.7)
R-squared 0.611 0.616 0.617 0.618 0.680 0.685
PANEL B: First Stage (2) - Dependant Variable: Post Treatment x Poor Institutions
Contagion x Settler Mortality -0.205* -0.00134 -0.0129 -0.0117 -0.178 -0.214
(0.105) (0.169) (0.168) (0.168) (0.174) (0.175)
Settler Mortality x Post94 914.4*** 801.7*** 808.4*** 801.2*** 1,001*** 991.6***
(105.3) (127.7) (127.3) (127.8) (139.6) (139.1)
R-squared 0.686 0.688 0.690 0.691 0.741 0.743
PANEL C: Second Stage - Dependant Variable: Bureaucratic Quality
Contagion x Poor Institutions -0.205 -0.833*** -0.868*** -0.873*** -0.737*** -0.781***
(0.139) (0.214) (0.212) (0.211) (0.227) (0.246)
Settler Mortality x Post94 0.249** 0.569*** 0.587*** 0.621*** 0.491*** 0.561***
(0.115) (0.150) (0.149) (0.147) (0.164) (0.178)
C-D Minimum Eigenvalue 72.7 34.9 34.7 34.3 30.2 26.5
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Non-interacted treatments N Y Y Y Y Y
Di. reaction if high st.cap. N Y Y Y Y Y
Military Regimes N N Y Y Y Y
Democracy N N N Y Y Y
GDP per capita N N N N Y Y
External Debt N N N N Y Y
Exports N N N N Y Y
Openness to Trade N N N N N Y
Interdependence with Mexico N N N N N Y
Observations 616 616 616 616 528 484
Number of Countries 56 56 56 56 49 45
Notes: All models are estimated using IV. The time period included in the sample is restricted to 1987-
1998. The second stage dependent variable in all columns is Bureaucratic Quality. All models include
country xed eects and year xed eects. Contagion x Settler Mortality refers to the interaction between
Post94, Settler Mortality and Closeness to Mexico. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
41Table 3: Robustness check: clustered standard errors
Dependant Variable: Bureaucratic Quality
Reduced Form Estimates IV estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Contagion x Settler Mortality -0.597* -0.622* -0.627**
(0.331) (0.321) (0.313)
Contagion x Poor Institutions -0.833* -0.868* -0.873*
(0.503) (0.492) (0.493)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Non-interacted treatments Y Y Y Y Y Y
Di. reaction if high st.cap. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Military Regimes N Y Y N Y Y
Democracy N N Y N N Y
GDP per capita N N N N N N
External Debt N N N N N N
Exports N N N N N N
Openness to Trade N N N N N N
Interdependence with Mexico N N N N N N
Observations 616 616 616 616 616 616
R-squared 0.106 0.156 0.175
C-D Minimum Eigenvalue 34.9 34.7 34.3
Number of Countries 56 56 56 56 56 56
Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. The time period included in the sample is restricted to
1987-1998. The dependent variable in all columns is Bureaucratic Quality. All models include country
xed eects and year xed eects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the country and year
levels. Contagion x Settler Mortality refers to the interaction between Post94, Settler Mortality and
Closeness to Mexico. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Placebo Estimates of Contagion on Bureaucratic Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Placebo `86 Placebo `87 Placebo `88 Placebo `89 Placebo `90 Placebo `91
Contagion x Settler Mortality 0.00153 0.0263 0.0439 0.0275 -0.0206 -0.0531
(0.0520) (0.0512) (0.0494) (0.0465) (0.0477) (0.0494)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Non-interacted treatments Y Y Y Y Y Y
Di. reaction if high st.cap. Y Y Y Y Y Y
Military Regimes Y Y Y Y Y Y
Democracy Y Y Y Y Y Y
GDP per capita Y Y Y Y Y Y
External Debt N N N N N N
Exports N N N N N N
Openness to Trade N N N N N N
Interdependence with Mexico N N N N N N
Observations 366 422 478 534 590 646
R-squared 0.158 0.162 0.166 0.164 0.149 0.154
Number of countries 56 56 56 56 56 56
Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. The dependent variable in all columns is Bureaucratic Quality. All models
include country xed eects and year xed eects. Contagion x Settler Mortality refers to the interaction between Post94,
Settler Mortality and Closeness to Mexico. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
42Table 5: Falsication Tests of Other Potential Explanations
Perceptions Budget
VARIABLES Perceived Corruption Total Government Expenditures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Contagion x Settler Mortality 0.162 -0.140 -0.154 -0.153 0.738 1.318 1.525 1.855
(0.109) (0.175) (0.174) (0.174) (0.695) (1.143) (1.153) (1.154)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Non-interacted treatments Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Di. reaction if high st.cap. N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Military Regimes N N Y Y N N Y Y
Democracy N N N Y N N N Y
GDP per capita N N N N N N N N
External Debt N N N N N N N N
Exports N N N N N N N N
Openness to Trade N N N N N N N N
Interdependence with Mexico N N N N N N N N
Observations 616 616 616 616 315 315 315 315
R-squared 0.062 0.075 0.084 0.084 0.078 0.086 0.091 0.106
Number of Countries 56 56 56 56 31 31 31 31
Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. The time period included in the sample is restricted to 1987-1998. All
models include country xed eects and year xed eects. Contagion x Settler Mortality refers to the interaction
between Post94, Settler Mortality and Closeness to Mexico. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: Correlations between State Capacity/Capital Controls and Bureaucratic Quality
Capital Controls Bureaucratic Quality
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State Capacity Index -0.0235*** -0.0238*** -0.0188***
(0.00376) (0.00383) (0.00387)
Capital Controls -0.316*** -0.236*** -0.0462
(0.0679) (0.0683) (0.0666)
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Perfect st.cap. Control Y Y Y Y Y Y
Military Regimes N Y Y N Y Y
Democracy N N Y N Y Y
Population N N Y N Y Y
GDP per capita N N Y N Y Y
Quality of Institutions N N N N N Y
Observations 661 661 661 661 661 661
R-squared 0.112 0.113 0.143 0.018 0.089 0.265
Number of Countries 56 56 56 56 56 56
Notes: All models are estimated using OLS. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Institutions 1,589 2.69 2.24 0 9.5
Bureaucratic Quality 1,589 3.299 1.54 0.2 6
Genetic Closeness to Mexico 1,620 1204 543.2 14.14 1835
Settler Mortality 904 4.69 1.21 2.15 7.99
GDP Per Capita 1,695 7,147 7,079 155 39,873
Population (1,000) 1,695 40,188 137,022 211 1,255,698
Democratic 1,694 0.487 0.499 0 1
Military Rule 1,686 0.05 0.218 0 1
43